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U.S. at 119 (1932». The Supreme
Court granted the Board's petition
for certiorari and reversed.
In the majority opinion written
by ChiefJustice Rehnquist, the Court
first considered whether the respondents could contest the 1977 order
disso 1ving the desegregation decree.
The Board argued that the 1977
finding ofunitariness barred the respondents from challenging the order. Id. at 635. Because the lower
courts inconsistently used the term
''unitary,'' confusion arose in interpreting the 1977 order. As a result,
the Court held that when a desegregation decree is to be terminated, all
parties are "entitled to a rather precise statement" to that effect from
the court. Id. at 636.
In its analysis, the Court focused
on the standard for dissolving desegregation decrees and placed great
weight on the nature of injunctions
issued in desegregation cases. In
distinguishing the nature ofthe Swift
injunction on which the court of
appeals had relied, the Court recognized that "federal supervision of
local school systems was intended
as a temporary measure to remedy
past discrimination." Id. at 637.
Accordingly, the Court found that
dissolution standards, which applied
to other injunctions that were designed to operate in perpetuity, were
not the proper standards to apply to
desegregation decrees that were temporary by their very nature. Id.
The Court held that after local
authorities had complied with the
desegregation decree for a "reasonable period of time," the decree's
dissolution was proper. Id. In determining a school district's compliance with desegregation decrees, the
court first must conclude that the
school board had "complied in good
faith with the desegregation decree
since it was entered." Id. at 638.
In deciding the question of good
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faith, "compliance with previous
court orders is obviously relevant."
Id. at 637. In this case, the Board
complied with the decree from 1972
until 1985. The Court held, therefore, that the court of appeals had
erred in relying on United States v.
W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629
(1953), for the proposition that
"compliance alone cannot become
the basis for modifying or dissolving an injunction." Dowell, 111 S.
Ct. at 637. The Court also recognized that the "grievous wrong" test,
which the court of appeals gleaned
from Swift, would place school
boards under judicial supervision
indefinitely. Id. at 638. This result
conflicted with the purpose ofschoo 1
desegregation injunctions, which
sought only to remedy past segregation, prevent future discrimination,
and ultimately return schools to local control. Id.
Next, the Court instructed lower
courts to determine if the "vestiges
of past discrimination had been
eliminated to the extent practicable."
Id. In evaluating this criteria, the
Court stated that consideration must
be given not only to student assignments, but also to "every facet of
school operations - faculty, staff,
transportation, extra-curricular activities and facilities." Id. (quoting
Green v. New Kent County School
Board, 391 U.S. 430,435 (1968».
On remand, the Court instructed
the district court to determine (1) if
the Board had complied in good
faith with the desegregation decree
since its imposition and (2) if the
vestiges of past discrimination had
been eliminated as far as practicable
throughout every facet ofthe school
district's operations. If the district
court found that the Board was entitled to have the injunction lifted, it
must then proceed to evaluate the
SRPunderthemandatesoftheEqual
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. [d.
In dissent, Justice Marshall,
joined by Justices Blackmun and
Stevens, sought a stricter standard
than the majority for ending court
supervised desegregation. Drawing
on Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954), the dissenters
argued that a decree should not be
lifted while conditions likely to inflict the type of stigma identified in
Brown still remained. So long as
"racially identifiable schools" and
other conditions likely to inflict such
injury persisted, and while at the
same timethere were feasible means
of eliminating them, the dissenters
would not terminate desegregation
decrees. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 639
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
The decision in Board ofEducation ofOklahoma City v. Dowell set
down standards for dissolution of
desegregation decrees, thus making
it easier for school districts currently under supervision to be set on
their own again. Under the new
standards, a school system that was
at one time segregated and subject
to a desegregation order may have
that order terminated upon a showing that it has complied with the
order in good faith for a "reasonable
period oftime," has abandoned any
discriminatory practices to the extent "practicable," and that it is unlikely that the school system would
again resort to discriminatory practices.
- Robert D. Cole Jr.

Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Service Co.: ALPHABETIZED DIRECTORY
LISTINGS CONSISTING OF
SURNAMES AND TELEPHONE NUMBERS ARE NOT
SUBJECT TO COPYRIGHT
PROTECTION.
In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 111 S.

0.1282(1991), the Supreme Court
of the United States held that a telephone directory listing subscribers
alphabetically by surname was not
sufficiently original to be afforded
copyright protection. The Court
classified the directories as compilations of factual raw data, but held
that the directories were not "selected, coordinated, or arranged" as
necessary to constitute a valid
copyrightable compilation.
Feist Publications, Inc. (Feist),
was a publishing company of large
directories covering eleven telephone service areas. Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc. (Rural), was a certified public telephone
service who, pursuant to state regulation, produced a telephone directory for its telephone service subscribers. As both Feist and Rural
profited from the sale of yellow
page advertisements, the two directories were in direct competition
with one another.
Feist attempted to obtain a license from Rural to use Rural's
white page listings. Although Rural
refused to issue the license, Feist
nevertheless used the listings for its
directory. Although F eistperformed
some independant verification and
specifically used street addresses
with its listings, 1,309 ofthe 46,878
listings in Feist's directory were
identical to those in Rural's. Of
those identical listings, four were
fictitious names and numbers which
Rural had intentionally placed in its
directory to detect copying.
The District Court for the District of Kansas held that Rural's
directories were copyrightable compilations and that Feist had infringed
on Rural's valid copyright. The
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. Certiorari was granted
by the United States Supreme Court
to determine whether the alphabetized directory consisting of sur-

names and telephone numbers was
copyrightable.
The Court began its analysis by
stating that "[t]he most fundamental
axiom of copyright law," is that,
facts and ideas are not copyrightable.
Id. at 1287 (citing Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985».
The Court noted that the Constitutionmandatesoriginality, which has
been developed to mean that ''the
work was independently created by
the author (as opposed to copied
from other works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree
of creativity." Id. (citing 1 M.
Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Copyright
§§ 2.01[A], [B] (1990) (hereinafter
Nimmer». The Court explained
that originality does not require novelty, but only a slight amount of
creativity. [d. (citing Nimmer, §
1.08[C][1]). Moreover, the Court
noted that two identical works that
were created independently may
both be the subject ofa valid copyright. [d. at 1287-88 (citing Sheldon
v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp.,
81 F.2d 49,54 (2nd Cir. 1936».
The Court went on to explain
that facts were not subject to copyright because facts were not original
and were not attributable to an act of
authorship. "The distinction is one
between creation and discovery: the
first person to find and report a
particular fact has not created the
fact; he or she has merely discovered its existence." [d. at 1288.
Facts, therefore, remain in the public domain.
Although facts are not
copyrightable, factual compilations
may be the subject of copyright.
However, only those elements of
the compilation which are original
to the author will be protected. A
telephone directory is considered
by the Court to be a compilation. [d.
Identical facts may be used without

infringment so long as the facts are
not "selected, coordinated and arranged" identically. [d. at 1289.
The Court noted that a number of
lower court decisions mistakingly
permitted copyright protection for
"sweat of the brow," which was the
courts' way of rewarding hard work
of an author. [d. at 1291. The most
blatant flaw with this type of doctrine, the Court explained, was that
it extended copyright protection to
the underlying facts of a compilation, preventing subsequent authors
of compilations from using already
acquired factual information. They
instead had to arrive at the same
result through their own hard work
and independant creation. [d. (citing Jeweler's Circular Publishing
Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co., 281
F. 83 (2nd Cir. 1922».
The object of copyright law, the
Court noted, was to ''promote the
Progress ofScience and useful Arts,"
not to reward the labor of authors.
[d. at 1290 (quoting U.S. Const. art.
I, §8, cl. 8). One reason for not
permitting facts to retain copyright
protection, the Court explained, is
the need to "disseminate factual
works." [d. at 1292 (quoting Ha1per
& Row, 471 U.S. at 563).
Compilation was defined by statute as "a work formed by the collection and assembly of pre-existing
materials or ofdata that are selected,
coordinated, or arranged in such a
way that the resulting work as a
whole constitutes an original work
ofauthorship." Id at 1293 (quoting
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976». The Court
explained that the purpose of statutory language was to emphasize that
compilations are not copyrightable
per se. The Court noted:
[the] statute identifies three
distinct elements and requires each to be met for a
work to qualify as a
copyrightable compilation:
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(1) the collection and assembly of pre-existing material, facts, or data; (2) the
selection, coordination, and
arrangement of those materials; and (3) the creation,
by virtue of the particular
selection, coordination, or
arrangement, of an "original" work ofauthorship. Id.
The Court noted that the first and
third elements were self-explanatory. The key issue was found in the
second element: "whether the selection, coordination, and arrangement
are sufficiently original to merit protection." Id. at 1294. The Court
noted that the language, "in such a
way," suggested that some compilations would be copyrightable while
others would not. Id. Relying on
precedent, the Court justified that
every clause and word of a statute
should be given effect. Id. (citing
Moskal v. United States, 111 S. Ct.
1032 (1991».
The Court held that alphabetizing surnames for white pages did
not satisfy the minimum constitutional standards for copyright protection and was "devoid of even the
slightest trace of creativity." Id. at
1296. The selection of surnames,
the Court found, was obvious and
"lacks the modicum of creativity
necessary to transform mere selection into copyrightable expression."
Id. Moreover, Rural did not "select" to publish the surnames in its
directory, but was required by state
statute to publish the names and
telephone numbers of its subscribers. !d. at 1296-97. Lastly, the
Court noted that alphabetizing by
surname was "an age-old practice,
firmly rooted in tradition and so
commonplace that it has come to be
expected as a matter of course." Id.
at 1297.
The Supreme Court's holding in
Feist allows publishers ofwhite page
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listings to pilfer from theircompetitors simply because the surnames
were alphabetized, thereby lacking
originality. Although Feist and
Rural made their profit exclusively
from yellow page advertisements,
many other directories exist where
the publishers profit solely from the
directories themselves. Knowing
that a rival may simply reproduce
and profit from one's compilation
may result in publishers engaging in
other forms of publication which
are less vulnerable to piracy by competitors.
- Kimberly A. Doyle
Harmelin v. Michigan: MANDATORY SENTENCE OF
LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE
DOES NOT VIOLATE
EIGHTH AMENDMENT.
In the plurality opinion of
Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct.
2680 (1991), the United States Supreme Court held that a mandatory
sentence of life in prison withoutthe
possibility of parole did not violate
the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. In its analysis, the Court
reviewed the history of the Eighth
Amendment in order to determine
whether a mandatory sentence could
be imposed without considering
mitigating factors. The Court refused to extend the so-called "individualized capital-sentencing doctrine" to cases other than those imposing the death penalty.
Ronald Harmelin was convicted
of possessing 672 grams ofcocaine.
Although Harmelin had no prior
convictions, he received a mandatory sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole pursuant to Michigan law. The Michigan
Court of Appeals reversed
Harmelin's conviction on the
grounds that evidence in support of
the conviction was obtained in violation of Michigan's Constitution.

On petition for rehearing, however,
the court of appeals vacated its reversal and affirmed HarmeIin's sentence. The Michigan Supreme Court
denied leave to appeal, and the
United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari.
Harmelin set forth two reasons
that his sentence was unconstitutional as a violation of the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment. First,
Harmelin contended that the sentence was unconstitutional because
the punishment was significantly
disproportionate to the crime committed. Id. Second, Harmelin argued that the sentence violated the
Eighth Amendment because it was
mandatory, and therefore, precluded
the trial judge from considering any
particular circumstance of the crime
and the criminal. Specifically,
Harmelin contended that it was cruel
and unusual to impose such a severe, mandatory sentence as life
imprisonment without considering
mitigating factors.
To begin its analysis, a plurality
ofthe court held that "[slevere, mandatory penalties may be cruel, but
they are not unusual in the constitutional sense .... " The Court noted
that our nation's history has long
provided examples of mandatory
penalties, including death sentences.
Id. The Court reasoned, therefore,
that a sentence which was not otherwise cruel and unusual did not become such simply because it was
mandatory. Id.
The Court then considered
whether the Eighth Amendment required an individualized sentencing
determination that the punishment
imposed be appropriate to the crime
committed. Id. The Court noted
that such an individualized sentencing determination was, in fact, applicable in capital cases, and imposition of the death penalty without

